## **Exhibit G**

09-50026-mg Doc 13656-7 Filed 06/24/16 Entered 06/24/16 17:52:12 Exhibit G

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## UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

. Case No. 09-50026-reg

IN RE: Chapter 11

MOTORS LIQUIDATION COMPANY, . (Jointly administered)

et al., f/k/a GENERAL .
MOTORS CORP., et al, .

OTORS CORP., et al, . One Bowling Green . New York, NY 10004

Debtors. . New York, NY 10004

. Monday, August 31, 2015

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9:48 a.m.

TRANSCRIPT OF NOTICE OF HEARING/NOTICE OF STATUS CONFERENCE TO BE HELD IN CONNECTION WITH THE COURT'S CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER, DATED AUGUST 19, 2015 [Dkt. No. 13383], AND THE LETTERS FILED IN RESPONSE THERETO (RELATED DOCUMENT(S) 13383) [13396]

BEFORE THE HONORABLE ROBERT E. GERBER

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

For the Debtor: King & Spalding LLP

By: ARTHUR STEINBERG, ESQ.
SCOTT DAVIDSON, ESQ.

1185 Avenue of the Americas New York, New York 10036-4003

(212) 556-2158

For General Motors on behalf of participating

unit holders:

Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP

By: NAOMI MOSS, ESQ.

One Bryant Park

New York, NY 10036-6745

(212) 872-1000

APPEARANCES CONTINUED.

Audio Operator: Frances Ferguson, ECR

Transcription Company: Access Transcripts, LLC

10110 Youngwood Lane Fishers, IN 46038 (855) 873-2223

www.accesstranscripts.com

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## APPEARANCES (Continued):

For the Ignition Switch plaintiffs and certain non-Ignition Switch plaintiffs:

Brown Rudnick LLP

By: EDWARD S. WEISFELNER, ESQ. HOWARD S. STEEL, ESQ.

7 Times Square

New York, New York 10036

(212) 209-4917

For the GUC Trust Administrator:

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP

By: LISA RUBIN, ESQ.

MATTHEW J. WILLIAMS, ESQ.

200 Park Avenue

New York, New York 10166-0193

(212) 351-4000

For Sesay, Bledsoe and Elliott:

GARY PELLER, ESQ.

600 New Jersey Ave., NW Washington, DC 20001

(202) 662-9122

For Personal Injury Accident Plaintiffs:

Goodwin Procter LLP

By: WILLIAM P. WEINTRAUB, ESQ.

The New York Times Building

620 Eighth Avenue

New York, NY 10018-1405

(212) 813-8839

For Interested Party

Watershed Asset

Management:

Watershed Asset Management, LLC

By: MICHELE F. KYROUZ 1 Maritime Plaza, #1525 San Francisco, CA 94111

(415) 391-8900

For Interested Party

Amer Tiwana:

CRT Capital Group, LLC

By: AMER TIWANA

262 Harbor Drive, #101 Stamford, CT 06902

(203) 569-6400

## TELEPHONIC APPEARANCES:

For the Ignition Switch Plaintiffs:

Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP By: STEVE W. BERMAN, ESQ. 1918 Eighth Avenue, Suite 3300 Seattle, WA 98101 (206) 623-7292

Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein By: ELIZABETH J. CABRASER, ESQ. 275 Battery Street, 29th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111-3339 (415) 956-1000

For Participating Unit Holders:

Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP

By: NAOMI MOSS, ESQ.
DANIEL H. GOLDEN, ESQ.

One Bryant Park

New York, NY 10036-6745

(212) 827-8010

For the Debtor: Hanson Bolkcom Law Group, LTD.

By: MARY E. BOLKCOM, ESQ.

527 Marquette Avenue, Suite 2300

Minneapolis, MN 55402

(612) 342-2880

For The Bavlsik

Plaintiffs: The Simon Law Firm, P.C. By: KEVIN M. CARNIE, ESQ. 800 Market Street, Suite 1700

St. Louis, MO 63101

(314) 241-2029

For Designated Counsel: Stutzman, Bromberg, Esserman & Plifka

By: BRIANA L. CIONI, ESQ.
DAVID J. PARSONS, ESQ.
2323 Bryan Street, Suite 2200

Dallas, TX 75201 (214) 969-4986

For Interested Party

Reorg Research, Inc.: Reorg Research, Inc.
By: KENT COLLIER

1140 Broadway

New York, NY 10001

(212) 257-4383

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TELEPHONIC APPEARANCES: (Continued)

For Doris Phillips: Josh Davis Law Firm

By: JOSHUA P. DAVIS, ESQ.

101 Lamar, Suite 200 Houston, TX 77002 (713) 337-4100

For Law Debenture Trust Company of

New York:

Kelley Drye & Warren LLP By: BENJAMIN D. FEDER, ESQ.

101 Park Avenue New York, NY 10178

(212) 808-7974

For MDL Plaintiffs: Hilliard Munoz & Gonzales LLP

> By: ROBERT C. HILLIARD, ESQ. 719 Shoreline Blvd., #500 Corpus Christi, TX 78401

(361) 882-1612

(Proceedings commence at 9:48 a.m.)

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THE COURT: I think I know all of you. There's no need for you to make appearances in advance, but when you come up to the mike, the main lectern to speak, please identify yourselves for the record.

I've read all of your letters and the attachments to the extent that I haven't read them previously. I have problems with both sides' positions, especially vis-a-vis proposals on timing, but also vis-a-vis matters of substance. It seems to me that neither side acknowledges -- and I'm pushing the GUC Trust and the indentured trustee off to the  $12 \parallel$  side for the time being. It seems to me that neither side 13∥ acknowledges that it is subject to the jurisdiction and rulings of two separate judges and that anything Jesse Furman says counts, as far as I'm concerned, and I would have thought that anything that I say counts insofar as proceedings in the district court is concerned. And what I need from each of you is realistic proposals in terms of prioritization of matters so that I can get Jesse Furman the rulings he needs so that the 20 bellwether trial or trials are not delayed.

It seems to me, subject to your rights to be heard, 22| that by far the most important of the matters that we need to address are the matter of punitives. And I will also decide preliminarily, to the extent that it's necessary, the matter of imputation, but I thought I had already made my views on

mootness finding, which, subject to appeal, basically tells all of us that we will not be able to go back and claw back, for lack of a better term, against the existing GUC Trust beneficiaries. So what the complaints say is, your failure to give us the information that was in your exclusive possession, causing us not to file proofs of claim, damaged us to the extent that we were not lined up with every other plaintiff as part of -- or every other claimant as part of the proof of claim universe, that we were denied the opportunity to 10 participate from dollar one in the GUC Trust.

Now, that's a claim that Your Honor is, I quess, 12 being asked to determine, and we think it's a failure 13∥ straightforward question. Is that a claim against Old GM or is it a claim against New GM? We assert that it's a claim against New GM. We're saying that New GM's failure -- from the time it 16 became New GM up through and including the bar date is the 17∥ focus of our attention -- is a claim solely against New GM. 18 The beginning and the end of the allegations is New GM knew on the date it came into existence that there was an ignition switch defect, what its potential was, that it needed to be recalled as a matter of federal law, that it failed to do so and it failed to do so purposefully, thus preventing the plaintiffs from filing proofs of claim. And a court can determine whether or not that's a cognizable claim, and if it is, what the element of damages ought to be.

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THE COURT: Now, pause again. When you said the court in that last context, you were talking about Judge Furman after I have done my gatekeeping.

MR. WEISFELNER: Correct. Or in the case of the state claims, the relevant courts that those state claims are currently pending in.

THE COURT: And how would a state have standing to assert a claim of that character?

MR. WEISFELNER: Well, again, to the extent that --10 and I guess I've misspoke. To my knowledge, neither the State 11 of California nor the State of Arizona had that allegation 12 within their complaint. It's only a second amended consolidated complaint.

THE COURT: Okay. But you're talking about in your 15 constituency, your vehicle owners, and their contention is that 16 if the recall had taken place in the gap period between the 17|| sale and the bar date, your guys could have filed claims and then they would have gotten the 25 or 30 cents, whatever unsecureds got in the case.

MR. WEISFELNER: Precisely. That's exactly right.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. WEISFELNER: And again, Your Honor, to the extent 23 that New GM contends that somehow that claim isn't an independent claim, is instead a disguised successor liability claim, to the extent Your Honor needs briefing on that topic, I guess we'll brief it. We'll comply with whatever Your Honor's desires are in that regard. But it seems to me, again, a gating issue is what part of the second amended consolidated complaint, including this particular cause of action, do you believe fails to satisfy independent claim status and why.

Next issue in Mr. Steinberg's letter was the contention that state law consumer protection statutes related to Old GM vehicles and parts are somehow improper. And Your Honor, it's our contention that, again, as a gatekeeper, if you determine that the claims, based on state law consumer protection statutes or otherwise, relate to New GM and what New GM did or failed to do as opposed to what Old GM did or failed to do, that depending on the particular state consumer protection statutes, they either give rise to a claim or cause of action to be determined by the trial court or they don't. And the role of the gatekeeper, Your Honor, is to determine whether or not those particular allegations relying on state consumer protection laws do or do not constitute independent claims versus disguised successor liability claims.

Likewise, the next issue, failure to warn and duty to recall an Old GM vehicle. It is New GM's position, which we believe is a blatant attempt to re-litigate what Your Honor has already decided, but it's New GM's apparent position now that an allegation against New GM sounding in the nature of a failure to warn or a breached duty to recall, if it involves an

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1 itself because we believe that New GM, in fact, engaged in bad 2 faith. It's one of the issues we will pursue on appeal. It's 3 one of the reasons why we think the bar against successor 4 liability ought not be enforced.

But putting aside good faith or bad faith, the question is if you have a purchaser in a 363 sale, may the bankruptcy court that approves that sale and gives the buyer free and clear protections, including successor liability, nevertheless afford the buyer prospective protection for its own independent tortious conduct? And we think that the clear answer to that proposition is no.

So again, if a non-ignition switch defect claimant, whether would start an independent claim against New GM, would that non-ignition switch plaintiff be successful, vis-a-vis Your Honor as a gatekeeper. New GM's contention is that, aha, wait a second, the non-ignition switch plaintiff cannot assert an independent claim against New GM unless and until that non-ignition switch plaintiff demonstrates that back in '09, its due process rights were violated. Because Your Honor only determined that independent claims were permissible having first determined that the ignition switch plaintiffs' due process rights were violated with prejudice because they didn't have an opportunity to argue over breadth of the injunction.

So that's the last issue I can think of where we have a marked disagreement between Mr. Steinberg and I. It's my

1 belief that Your Honor's determination that the law in the Second Circuit, that the law across this country is uniform, and that is that a buyer in a 363 sale, putting aside whether or not it's acting in good faith, does not obtain a get-out-of-jail-free card for its own post-sale tortious conduct, bad actions, fraudulent concealment.

THE COURT: I understand the issue. Pause. If you said this before in baby talk, I don't remember it. Are you now going to be kind of a designated counsel for non-ignition switch plaintiffs, as well --

MR. WEISFELNER: Your Honor --

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THE COURT: -- or did they have separate counsel? MR. WEISFELNER: They do not have separate counsel, and to the extent that their rights need to be preserved, since co-lead counsel in the MDL does have actions pending on their 16 behalf, subject, of course, to subsequent certification of classes and that sort of thing, yes, we perceive ourselves as having taken on the mantel of preserving and protecting the rights of non-ignition switch plaintiffs in this court.

THE COURT: So I don't have to worry about them not 21 having been heard if I listen to you.

MR. WEISFELNER: I think that's a correct conclusion, 23 especially in light of Your Honor's procedures in the judgment itself.

THE COURT: Okay. Continue or were you done now?

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MR. WEISFELNER: Your Honor, subject to whatever
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   questions or concerns you have, I'd be done. I just want to
   make sure that neither of my overseers, Mr. Berman or Ms.
   Cabraser, have any further comments that they'd like to make.
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             THE COURT: Is Mr. Berman on the phone?
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             MR. WEISFELNER: I believe so.
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             MR. BERMAN: (Telephonically) Yes, Your Honor. I'm
   on the phone. I think that he did a great job covering our
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   interests here.
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             THE COURT: I'm sorry, you're not very audible. Can
   you say it slower and louder, please?
             MR. BERMAN: I think that he's covered everything
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   well and I have nothing to add.
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             THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Stein --
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             MS. CABRASER: (Telephonically) Your Honor,
16 Elizabeth Cabraser.
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             THE COURT: Wait, I'm sorry. Before you come up,
18 Mr. Steinberg, I thought I heard something on the phone after
19 Mr. Berman said he had nothing to add.
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             MS. CABRASER: Your Honor, Elizabeth Cabraser,
21 co-lead for the economic loss plaintiffs. You heard me.
22 apologize for not speaking more slowly. I'm simply concurring,
23 as is Mr. Berman, subject to Your Honor's (indiscernible). I
24 have nothing to add at this point.
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             THE COURT: Okay. I asked my questions as we went
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And courts of competent jurisdiction are amply able to ultimately determine whether or not imputation, under the law of whatever jurisdiction will govern -- I presume there may be some differences on imputation. It's not necessarily federal common law, I don't know, but it's not something that I think the Bankruptcy Court rightfully ought to be focused on, and I don't think it's what Judge Furman had in mind in terms of triaging issues.

Now, the other thing that Mr. Steinberg then slipped 10 in when he talked about what he wants to triage, he talked about punitives because you can't get away from what Judge Furman said about that. He talked about imputation, and I think, quite frankly, he's banging his head against the wall, 14 but he wants to see what happens. Maybe Your Honor will bite on it.

The third thing he talked about is other causes of 17 action proscribed by the sale order and original injunction and causes of action that are still proscribed based on Your Honor's sale order and injunction. Well, that's a whole 20 another reargument again. I went through carefully a list of 21 the issues in his letter, and I think I made it clear that in 22 terms of the way we should be going forward by way of a 23 schedule and what we ought to be triaging, and in an effort to 24 make our next meet and confer reasonable, Judge, we need some 25 direction beyond the triage that Judge Furman says he needs --

THE COURT: Well, I can give you a little more
direction that may help your meet and confer, and it ties into
one of the very few well, perhaps very few is an
overstatement what I consider to be one of the closer
questions that you guys were arguing about, which is that when
people have not shown a due process violation yet, that being
the subset of your larger constituency with non-ignition switch
issues, where they have not shown that 24 people or even one
person at New GM had enough knowledge to make them knowing
plaintiffs or knowing claimants, excuse me whether they
should get benefits that the remainder of your constituency won
in the last go-around. And Mr. Steinberg's position, as I
understand it, is that even if it is so, that if I were ruling
on a clean slate with the ability to be heard back in 2009,
that what I ultimately ruled with respect to environmental
claimants and narrow view of economic loss claimants, vis-à-vis
ignition switches, whether they should or should not be
beneficiaries of that ruling, then they haven't established a
due process violation. That was the context in which I said
what I was saying.
Now, hopefully that's not too cryptic, but the

22 non-ignition switch plaintiffs' inability or inaction to have 23 yet established a due process violation to give them the 24 benefits that the remainder of your constituency got is, in my 25 view, a big issue.

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MR. WEISFELNER: Okay. I mean, again, just as a matter of fact, discovery with regard to the non-ignition switch defects that are at issue are ongoing. And while --THE COURT: I understood that, and it certainly was

MR. WEISFELNER: Right.

ongoing back on April 15th --

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THE COURT: -- which is why the opinion didn't cover them.

MR. WEISFELNER: Right. But, Your Honor, look, it  $10\,\|$  still seems to me that, you know, one could argue that whether or not you're the beneficiary of a due process violation 12 because you were a known creditor, nevertheless, Your Honor's 13 sale order could not as a matter of constitutional law, Second Circuit law, have provided New GM with a get out of jail free card with regard to its post-sale independent acts and conduct. 16 I just don't think that the --

THE COURT: I understand that's the argument you're 18 going to make. You had telegraphed that before. My guess is 19 that Mr. Steinberg is going to have a different view, and 20 that's why I called it an issue rather than something that I've decided.

MR. WEISFELNER: Okay. To the extent that that 23 remains an issue, then in terms of triaging things, it seems to 24 me that we need to get that issue teed up quickly because to 25 the extent that people, either New GM or us, depending on who

loses, needs to appeal that decision, they ought to get started. But again, in terms of triaging the remaining issue, what frustrates us on the plaintiffs' side is every opportunity that New GM can take, it does take in an effort to try and reinterpret, redefine, cut down on, narrow the scope of the definition of independent claims.

And they're not all, as Mr. Steinberg indicated, briefed in the no strike/no stay pleading because we didn't see any of these issues emanating from New GM, frankly, until after Judge Furman denied the motions to withdraw the reference. And 11  $\parallel$  I think that emboldened New GM to try and take another bite at 12 the apple.

And, Your Honor, I think maybe the right thing to do 14 is, with your guidance, send us back to the drawing board. We will try desperately hard again to come up with an appropriate 16 scheduling order with the right issues. But again, to the extent that New GM insists on having Your Honor act as a 18 gatekeeper on issues that we believe are more properly resolved in the context of trial because we don't think it impacts Your 20 | Honor's role as a gatekeeper -- we think the gatekeeper role is tell us if this is an independent claim or not an independent 22 claim. And Mr. Steinberg can tell you there are 60 pages of 23 | allegations with regard to Old GM, and our point is you can 24 have 600 pages of allegations with regard to Old GM. Focus on 25 the claim and cause of action. Focus on what it is that you

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1 want recovery for. Focus in on what it is you're asking the jury to decide based on instructions from the judge.

And you will see that the liability we assert is New  $\parallel \mathsf{GM's}$  liability, that the allegations regarding Old GM are of  $5\parallel$  necessity background information. You don't start a story, if you will, about New GM -- I'm sorry, GM manufacturing cars with 7 known defective components beginning in '03 and '04, going through all sorts of evaluations, tests, and accumulation of information that the ignition switch defect, in fact, presented 10 a known safety defect that was killing people throughout the 11 country, that it chooses not to bring to the attention of the 12 Court during its bankruptcy proceeding, that New GM remains 13 completely well aware of from the date it's born and maintains that cone of silence throughout the period from 2009 through 15 2014.

And I'm here today to assess liability -- I'm talking 17 to a prospective jury -- against New GM because Old GM's gone 18∥ and Old GM isn't here and Old GM can't pay for this, and New GM shouldn't be made to pay for something that was an Old GM bad 20∥act or bad conduct. Now, I'm going to argue to the jury the 21 facts. I don't want to start the case by saying as of some 22 date in 2009, New GM was born.

THE COURT: I know that you don't want to start your 24 case that way, but you are going to start the case within the 25 constraints of what the law requires.

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